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But these modifications would need another international conference, and that was seriously impeded by war, the most significant of which was the Franco- Prussian war of 1870, which resulted in the fall of Paris and the capture and deposal of Napoleon III. Several attempts were made at various congresses to amend and improve the Geneva Convention. However, the
disappearance of Napoleon III from the politics of Europe restored the influence of the French High Command over the treaty negotiations. Political and diplomatic wrangling, mostly on the part of the French and the Austrians, delayed further progress.
Largely under the impetus of the Empress Euge- nie, Napoleon III’s widow, amendments extend- ing the terms of the Convention to war at sea were proposed, but it was not until the second Geneva Convention of 1906 that the term actually passed.
The limitation of armaments never got out of the starting gate. Nor did the extension of the 1864 principles to naval warfare, which had to wait until the second Hague Convention in 1907, though they did manage to include an article about the inviolability of properly identi- fied hospital ships. The 1899 Convention did succeed in establishing an International Court of Arbitration. Efforts to make arbitration of international disputes compulsory failed, largely because of the Kai- ser’s opposition. His grudging agreement to voluntary arbitration was worded thus: “I consented to all this nonsense only in order that the Czar should not lose face before Europe. In practice however I shall rely on God and my sharp sword! And I shit on all their decisions.” This, His Majesty’s gracious consent to voluntary arbitration, actually sounds much ruder in German. But the participants succeeded in setting up a permanent court of arbitration. There were provisions for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. Asphyxiating gas was prohibited, as were orders of “no quarter” and the bombardment of undefended towns and pillaging. There were provisions for the for- malities of capitulation and armistices and the internment of soldiers by non-belligerents and the discharge of explosives from balloons.
The second Hague Convention was promoted by the new American president, Teddy Roosevelt, although, once again, it was the Czar who issued the invitations. Provisions were enacted for arbitration, medi- ation and commissions of inquiry. There were clauses dealing with the need for warning before opening hostilities and notification to non-belligerents. There were more provisions about prisoners of war, the notification of who had been taken prisoner, and facilitating the sending of letters and parcels for prisoners. Unanchored mines at sea were forbidden and tethered mines were to be removed at war’s end. Fishing vessels were to be free from capture or destruction.
A history of the Geneva Conventions would
not be complete without reference to the two
Hague conventions, which, to some extent sup-
plemented the Geneva Convention of 1864. The
first Hague convention was negotiated in 1899.
It was inspired by the Russian Ministers of War,
Finance and Foreign Affaires. Russia found it-
self well behind in the arms race, by then in full
swing amongst the European powers. They were
all bent on furnishing their armed forces with the
latest and most advanced weapons of destruction
produced by Krupps, Skoda, Vickers-Maxim and
Schneider-Creusot. The Russians were in despair
at the prospect of having to spend money they
did not have in order to match the expansion of
the arsenals of their traditional European enemies.
The ministers approached the Czar, Nicholas II,
in the summer of 1898. The young Czar imme-
diately sent off a circular letter to all the govern-
ments represented at St. Petersburg, proposing a
conference to attempt to reach an agreement for
the limitation of armaments. The spectacle of the
Czar of All the Russias proffering an olive branch
was received by the great powers with a mixture
of astonishment and disdain. The Prince of Wales,
soon to become Edward VII, unburdened him-
self of the opinion that “It is the greatest nonsense
and rubbish I ever heard of...The thing is impossible. France could never con- sent to it - nor we.” This sentiment more or less echoed the view of most of Europe’s rulers. It did not augur well for the success of the convention. Also on the agenda were motions to extend the principles of the 1864 convention to naval warfare, to prohibit the use of asphyxiating gas, the use of expanding bullets, the dreaded dum-dum bullets, and prohibiting the discharge of explo- sives from balloons. The original proposal also included a court of international arbitration for the compulsory settlement of international disputes.
Once again there was a failure to include any limitation of armaments. After all, Great Britain was in the process of laying down the keels of four new dreadnaughts, then the biggest warships ever built.
A further convention was planned for 1914 in Geneva, postponed for a year and then abandoned: rendered impossible by the butchery that followed the opening roar of the guns of August 1914.
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